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Abstract
As the Global Financial Crisis deepened, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September
15, 2008, and ensuing contagion began affecting the French economy and financial system.
France experienced declines in major economic indicators such as GDP, household
consumption, and investment. In addition, the ensuing credit crunch in financial markets
resulted in the seizing up of various lending markets. Due to conservative business
practices, a consolidated market structure, and a sound regulatory framework, the French
banks were relatively better situated than their European counterparts to weather the
crisis. However, the French authorities instituted a precautionary recapitalization scheme
in order to “restore market confidence” in these institutions. The French government
created the Société de prise de participations de l’État (SPPE), a limited liability company
that it wholly owned, in October 2008. It initially participated in the global bailout of Dexia,
a struggling Belgian-based European bank, and then began performing precautionary
recapitalizations to the broader French banking system. In order to finance itself, the SPPE
issued government-guaranteed debt to inject capital into financially sound banks. Banks
applied to receive funds from the SPPE during two separate rounds in exchange for
behavioral commitments, such as lending growth and limits on executive compensation.
From December 11, 2008, through the first half of 2009, the government injected more
than €20 billion (US$29 billion) into six major French banking groups in the form of
preference shares and subordinated debt. The recipients of capital injections, with the
exception of Dexia, paid back all capital and interest owed to the SPPE by May 19, 2011,
resulting in a net profit of €0.8 billion.
Keywords: French banks, precautionary recapitalization, preference shares, Titres super
subordonnés à durée indéterminée (TSS), two-phase injection, voluntary, SPPE

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital
injections. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Société de prise de participation de l’État (SPPE)
At a Glance

Summary of Key Terms

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers on September 15, 2008, and the
ensuing contagion, the French economy and
financial industry began experiencing
strain. In response, the French government
created a limited liability company, which it
wholly owned, called the Société de prise de
participations de l’État (SPPE) in October
2008. It initially participated in the global
bailout of Dexia, a struggling Belgian-based
European bank, and then began performing
precautionary recapitalizations to the
broader French banking system. In order to
finance itself, the SPPE issued governmentguaranteed debt to inject capital into
financially sound banks. The participant
banks received voluntary capital injections
in exchange for a number of behavioral
commitments,
including
executive
compensation and lending targets. These
commitments aligned with its stated goal to
“increase lending to the real economy by
3% to 4% per year” and “achieve an
average increase of 0.5% in each banking
group’s Tier One capital.”

Purpose: To “increase lending to the real economy
by 3% to 4% per year” and “achieve an average
increase of 0.5% in each banking group’s Tier One
capital” (BdF 2010a).
Announcement Date

October 20, 2008

Operational Date

December 11, 2008

End of Issuance Window

August 30, 2009
(extended from June 8,
2009)

Legal Authority

Article 6 of Loi no.
2008-1061 du 16
octobre 2008 de
finances rectificative
pour le financement de
l’économie

Peak Utilization

€10.5 billion (1st phase)
€11.85 billion (2nd
Phase)

Participants

Société Générale, BNP
Paribas, Groupe Crédit
Agricole, Groupe Crédit
Mutuel, Groupe Caisses
d’Epargne, Groupe
Banques Populaires

The first injection of €10.5 billion (US$15
billion3) consisted of deeply subordinated
debt called Titres super subordonnés à
Commission Bancaire
durée indéterminée (TSS) and provided Administrators
(CB); Agence France
capital to six major French banking groups
Trésor (AFT); Agence
on December 11, 2008. For the second
des Participations de
injection, banks were allowed to issue
l’État (APE)
either newly available preference shares
(core Tier 1 capital) or the TSS used in the first injection (non-core Tier 1 capital),
depending on the quality of capital specific banks required. The French government also
allowed banks to exchange TSS issued during the first injection for the newly available
preference shares. Throughout the first half of 2009, the French government injected

Between 2008 and 2011, the exchange rate was between €0.65 and €0.80 = US$1. This case study uses €0.7
= $1.
3
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€11.85 billion into four of the original six banks. The recipients of capital injections, with
the exception of Dexia, paid back all capital and interest owed to the SPPE by May 19, 2011,
resulting in a net profit of €0.8 billion.
Summary Evaluation
The SPPE successfully increased Tier 1 ratios of participating banks, provided protection
from liquidity and solvency risks, and allowed banks to raise capital in private markets. In
addition, all recipients of capital injections, with the exception of Dexia and the newly
merged BPCE, paid back their shares by December 2009. BPCE paid back all capital and
interest owed to the SPPE by May 19, 2011, resulting in a net profit of €0.8 billion from the
intervention, not including the Dexia stake. However, there is disagreement regarding
whether the behavioral commitments that the French government demanded in return for
capital injections were sufficiently onerous.
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France Context 2007– 2008
GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

$2,664.5 billion in 2007
$2,930.2 billion in 2008
$41,508 in 2007
$45,334 in 2008
As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$2,672.8 billion in total assets in
2007
$3,118.1 billion in total assets in
2008
100.4% in 2007
106.4% in 2008
Data not available.

74.2% of total banking assets in 2007
73.3% of total banking assets in 2008
6.0% of total banking assets in 2007
Foreign involvement in banking system
6.0% of total banking assets in 2008
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available.
Up to $100,000 in early December
Existence of deposit insurance
2008
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Fonds de
Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
Five-bank concentration of banking system
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Overview

Background
The French financial system had been large and complex in the years prior to the financial
crisis, accounting for 10% of the global banking system and 5% of global capital markets.
Due to its substantial size, it was integral to the European and international banking
system. The primary players within this market were a few large universal banks that
provided a wide array of financial services (Xiao 2009). For example, six French banking
groups—Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Groupe Crédit Agricole, Groupe Crédit Mutuel,
Groupe Caisses d’Epargne, and Groupe Banques Populaires—represented more than 80%
of France’s net banking income (EC 2008). With the exception of HSBC, foreign banks were
unable to penetrate this concentrated market. Although, it is important to note that
mergers and acquisitions across European borders often muddled the national affiliations
of banking groups (Xiao 2009).
In general, the French banking sector was better situated during the financial crisis in
comparison to its European neighbors due to a number of structural reasons. Since the
major banks adhered to a universal business model, providing a wide range of services,
they had a stable source of funding through deposits. They also had high capital ratios and
less exposure to subprime lending. Alternatively, French consumers, stemming from
cultural norms, were hesitant to accrue debt. Stringent usury laws protected these
consumers, making risky lending more difficult. French banks also provided home equity
lines of credit to consumers later than in the US, which limited the domestic credit
expansion in housing (Conac 2010). From a regulatory perspective, although the
Commission Bancaire (CB), the main French banking regulator, did liberalize its
supervision immediately before the crisis, it required banks to hold better quality capital
above Basel-dictated standards (Conac 2010; Xiao 2009). In particular, the CB limited
banks’ holdings of non-core Tier 1 capital to 25% of core Tier 1 capital, which was lower
than the limits in neighboring countries (Conac 2010). The CB raised this ceiling to 35% in
November 2008 so banks could take full advantage of the injections (EC 2008).
France’s favorable position required unique interventions tailored to its specific needs. As
the crisis deepened, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and
contagion of the Global Financial Crisis began impacting the French economy (Xiao 2009).
French GDP growth fell from 2.3% in 2007 to 0.3% in 2008, the worst rate in 15 years.
Similar to the rest of the euro area, France experienced substantial declines in major
economic indicators, with household consumption decreasing from 2.4% growth in 2007 to
0.9% in 2008 and investment slowing from 6.5% in 2007 to 0.4% in 2008 (BdF 2009). In
financial markets, the collapse of Lehman sparked turmoil across the globe. This shock
resulted in the seizing up of various lending markets, including interbank, senior
unsecured, securitized, and covered bonds. The credit crunch led to declining equity prices,
increased volatility, and widening spreads, which required government intervention across
the globe, including France (Xiao 2009).
Program Description
Following a Group of Seven (G7) industrialized nations meeting on October 10, 2008, which
focused on guiding principles for action during the financial crisis, the French government
pursued a dual approach to aid their banking system that included the Société de
financement de l’économie française (SFEF) and Société de prise de participation de l’État
(SPPE). The SFEF provided French banks with medium- and long-term financing when
difficult to find in private markets (BdF 2009). The French government created the SPPE in
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October 2008 as a limited liability company to perform recapitalizations. Its first injection
was €1 billion toward the international bailout of Dexia SA, a troubled Belgium-based bank
with operations across Europe, in return for a 5.7% stake in the company (SPPE 2010). As
the financial crisis spread in the fall of 2008, even relatively healthy French banks faced
issues stemming from a global “flight-to-quality” and credit crunch (Xiao 2009). In
December 2008, SPPE began a broad recapitalization scheme for French banks in order to
ensure they continued lending to the economy (BdF 2009). Even though the banks that
received assistance were sound, with the exception of Dexia, the SPPE attempted to
“restore market confidence” in these institutions. At the time, markets were putting
substantial pressure on banks, which could have resulted in reduced lending and negative
impacts on the overall French economy (EC 2008). This case study focuses on the bank
recapitalizations conducted by the SPPE.
The French National Assembly passed a law giving the SPPE the authority to recapitalize
banks on October 16, 2008 (L’Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008). Market expectations,
stemming from the announcement of assistance by the Dutch government to ING, sped up
the public announcement of this plan, which occurred on October 20, 2008 (Lagarde 2008).
On December 3, 2008, the French government then submitted an outline of the program to
the European Council, which approved it on December 8, 2008 (EC 2008). The SPPE
performed two rounds of capital injections, €10.5 billion in December 2008 and €11.85
billion during the first half of 2009, bringing the total intervention to €22.35 billion.
Through these actions, the government hoped “to increase lending to the real economy by
3% to 4% per year” and “achieve an average increase of 0.5% in each banking group’s Tier
One capital” (BdF 2010a). The SPPE funded itself by issuing state-guaranteed debt (EC
2008).
The first injection of €10.5 billion occurred on December 11, 2008, and was provided to
Société Générale (€1.7 billion), BNP Paribas (€2.55 billion), Groupe Crédit Agricole
(€3.0 billion), Groupe Crédit Mutuel (€1.2 billion), Groupe Caisses d’Epargne (€1.1 billion),
and Groupe Banques Populaires (€0.95 billion; see Figure 1 for an outline of the SPPE
injections) (Conac 2010; EC 2008). All these banking groups applied to receive capital and
were not obligated to do so. Although the budget for the scheme was €21 billion, the
European Commission (EC) authorized the SPPE to inject €10.5 billion in the first round,
with the option for banks to subscribe to a second injection in 2009 if market conditions
continued to worsen (EC 2008).
The capital used for the first injection consisted of deeply subordinated debt securities
commonly found in French markets, known in French as Titres super subordonnés à durée
indéterminée (TSS) (EC 2008). The TSS were more like equity than the subordinated debt
that US banks typically issue, in that they were perpetual, or matured after 99 years, and
loss-absorbing. For this reason, they qualified as non-core Tier 1 capital (EC 2008; Jabko
and Massoc 2012). The TSS issued to the SPPE paid a penalty interest rate. The CB partly
based the interest rate on each bank’s average credit default swap spread or credit rating,
to reflect individual bank’s relative riskiness. In addition, the nominal amount banks owed
on redemption increased each year, to encourage banks to redeem as quickly as possible. In
return for the injection of government capital, banks were required to adhere to a number
of behavioral constraints, including limitations on executive compensation and
commitments to increase their lending. However, these commitments were not legally
binding or backed by sanctions; instead, the CB relied on the reputational damage of
noncompliance (EC 2008). The CB limited TSS issuance to 35% of a bank’s total Tier 1
capital.
On January 21, 2009, the French authorities submitted to the European Commission an
amendment to the original application describing the terms of its second round of capital
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injections. In this round, banks had the option of issuing TSS (with the same characteristics
as before) or preference shares. The EC approved the amendment on January 28, 2009,
allowing banks to issue €11.85 billion of TSS or preference shares until August 30, 2009
(EC 2009a).
The beneficiary banks were required to issue preference shares that had similar
characteristics to TSS, such as Tier 1 capital, nonvoting, and loss-absorbing. However, the
preference shares were a form of equity and bore losses before the TSS. As such, they
qualified as core Tier 1 capital. There were no limits placed on dividends by the
participating banks; however, the CB prioritized dividend payments to preference shares
held by the SPPE over ordinary shareholders. They could account for up to 50% of the
share capital of an unlisted company and 25% of the share capital of a listed company,
higher than the limits for TSS. Since preference shares were more subordinate, and
therefore riskier, their remuneration was higher than that of the TSS (EC 2009a).
Banks could use the funds raised from issuing preference shares to redeem TSS they had
issued in the first injection (BdF 2010a). Only BNP Paribas took advantage of this
provision. It issued €5.1 billion of preference shares and used approximately half of those
funds to repurchase TSS, resulting in a net issuance of €2.55 billion. Of the six banks that
participated in the first injection, Société Générale (€1.7 billion), BNP Paribas (€5.1
billion), Groupe Caisses d’Epargne (€1.1 billion), and Banques Populaires Groupe (€0.95
billion) participated in the second injection. Groupe Crédit Agricole and Groupe Crédit
Mutuel declined to participate (see Figure 1 for an outline of the SPPE injections) (BdF
2010b).
Figure 1: Outline of SPPE Injections
Financial Institutions

First Injection (€ billions)

Second Injection (€ billions)

Société Générale

1.7

1.7

BNP Paribas

2.55

5.1*

Groupe Crédit Agricole

3.0

Groupe Crédit Mutuel

1.2

Groupe Caisses d’Epargne

1.1

1.1

Groupe Banques Populaires

0.95

0.95

Total

10.5

—
—

11.85**

* BNP used approximately half of the funds from the €5.1 billion preference shares issued in the second
injection to redeem TSS issued during the first injection, resulting in a net second injection amount of
€2.55 billion.
** The French government injected an additional €3 billion to assist in the merger of Groupe Caisses
d’Epargne and Groupe Banques Populaires.
Source: BdF 2010b.
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The second injection increased each bank’s Tier 1 capital by an additional 0.5% (BdF
2010a). Participating banks could exit the scheme by buying back the shares or debt at any
time, subject to the CB’s consent (EC 2009a). Due to the costly nature of the securities,
along with improved economic and financial conditions, most participants repurchased
their TSS and preferred shares by December 2009 (BdF 2010a). The only exception was the
newly Groupe Banques Populaires and Groupe Caisses d’Epargne (BPCE) (Conac 2010).
Following the final repayment of capital by BPCE on March 23, 2011, and its payment of
2010 dividends on May 19, 2011, the SPPE intervention during the Global Financial Crisis
was closed. In total, interventions through the SFEF and SPPE resulted in a net profit of
€2.7 billion, with the SPPE (not including its Dexia stake) accounting for €0.8 billion of that
total (see Figure 2 for the assets held by the SPPE) (Sénat 2011).
However, the SPPE did not close following the redemption of the capital injections, as it
continued to house shares of Dexia. The SPPE went on to participate in the second
international Dexia bailout in 2012 (Dexia 2019; Jabko and Massoc 2012). According to the
Dexia 2018 Annual Report, the SPPE still held 196,658,798 shares (46.81%) at the end of
2018, as the company continued to liquidate (Dexia 2019).
Figure 2: Assets Held by the SPPE
Type of Assets

Issuers

Titres
super
subordonnés à durée
indéterminée (TSS)

Groupe
Populaires

Preferred shares

Banques

Amount (as of June 6,
2011)

€1.95 billion

—

Groupe
Banques
Populaires – Groupe
Caisses
d’Epargne
merger group

€1.2 billion

—

Groupe
d’Epargne

€2.1 billion

—

Groupe Crédit Agricole

€3.0 billion

—

Société Générale

€1.7 billion

—

BNP Paribas

€5.1 billion

—

Société Générale

€1.7 billion

—

€3.0 billion

—

€0.6 billion

€0.3 billion

Groupe
d’Epargne
Ordinary shares

Amount (as of October
22, 2009)

Caisses

Caisses

Dexia

Source: SPPE n.d.
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Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: The SPPE was part of a two-pronged approach aimed at
recapitalizing banks and providing refinancing assistance.
In response to the Global Financial Crisis, the French government created two schemes, the
Société de financement de l’économie française and Société de prise de participation de
l’État, to aid their banking sector through refinancing assistance and capital injections. The
SFEF was a special purpose vehicle majority owned by France’s leading banks that
provided financing in exchange for collateral.4 In order to fund itself, the financing vehicle
issued bonds guaranteed by the French government (BdF 2009). The SPPE, a limited
liability company wholly owned by the French government, was financed by short-term
debt guaranteed and issued by the French government and subscribed to subordinated
debt or preference shares issued by banks (BdF 2009; SPPE 2010).
2. Legal Authority: The legal basis for the SPPE was Article 6 of the LOI no. 20081061 du 16 octobre 2008 de finances rectificative pour le financement de
l’économie.
On October 10, 2008, the Group of Seven industrialized nations created five principles to
guide government action during the financial crisis. One of the guiding principles that
directly applied to the SPPE involved “recapitalising public and private financial
institutions where required” (BdF 2009). Following the G7 meeting, the French presidency
of the European Union hosted a summit of the euro area on October 12, 2008, where euro
area leaders collectively agreed on the need for emergency measures (Jabko and Massoc
2012). The French government then convened an emergency legislative procedure on
October 16, 2008, to pass its own plan. Article 6 of the Law no. 2008-1061 of October 16,
2008, to rectify finance for the financing of the economy was adopted within one week and
allowed for the creation of both a recapitalization and a refinancing program (Conac 2010;
L’Assemblée nationale et le Sénat 2008).
3. Legal Authority: The European Commission approved the SPPE under Article
87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty as permitted State Aid but required some changes to
the plan.
Prior to approving the SPPE, the European Commission was required to determine
whether the scheme represented State Aid (State Aid N/613 2008). If the EC concluded the
SPPE was state aid then it would have an anti-competitive impact on the common market
and require further legal scrutiny. According to Article 87(1), State Aid is defined as below:
any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or
the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the common market (EC 2008).

4

See Fang (2020) for more information on the Société de financement de l’économie française (SFEF).
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Although the French government argued that the scheme did not constitute State Aid,
ultimately the EC disagreed.
As a result, the SPPE had to be approved under Article 87(3)(b), which affirms that State
Aid “may be considered to be compatible with the common market: (b) aid […] to remedy a
serious disturbance to the economy of a Member State.” The EC determined that the SPPE
was permitted under this provision as the program was well targeted (“in the case in point,
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”), necessary, and
proportionate (EC 2008). The French government initially allocated €40 billion for the
SPPE, but the EC revised this budget to €21 billion following its approval of the plan (BdF
2009). Furthermore, the EC implemented a two-stage intervention that allowed the second
injection only if markets conditions warranted it, along with a six-month application
window. The EC described these measures as an “additional safeguard against excessive
intervention by the State” (EC 2008).
4. Communications: The French government accelerated communications of the
plan’s details following the capital injection of €10 billion to ING by Dutch
authorities.
On October 19, 2008, the Dutch government announced that it would inject €10 billion of
nonvoting preferred shares into ING. This followed the announcement of the Troubled
Assets Relief Program, a $700 billion package announced by the United States. ING
described the funds as “a strong buffer to navigate the current market and economic
environment” (Jolly 2008). As a result, markets expected comparable schemes aimed at
improving capital ratios by other countries (Conac 2010). In particular, these injections
from various national authorities had “raised the bar for capital ratios” and led people to
believe “there are new capital standards in the market” (Jolly 2008).
Christine Lagarde, the French minister of the economy, industry, and finance, testified on
October 22, 2008, to the French National Assembly Finance Committee that the impetus
behind announcing the plan on October 20, 2008, was the Dutch intervention. She
explained that market expectations for similar plans by other European countries following
the Dutch government’s October 19 announcement weighed heavily on banks’ share prices
during the morning of October 20, 2008. In response, the French government decided to
remove the uncertainty and announce the plan that night. Lagarde clarified that the plan
had been in the works for several days and the Dutch announcement did not affect the
details of the plan, but changed the application schedule (Lagarde 2008).
The SPPE communicated its operations through the issuance of annual reports and the
Agence des Participations de l’État (APE), the French government shareholding agency,
absorbing its financial statements (SPPE 2010). The SPPE also had to report on the
implementation of the bank rescue plan to the legislature and the EC after the first six
months (EC 2008; L’Assemblée nationale et Sénat 2008).
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5. Governance/Administration: The French state was the SPPE’s sole shareholder
and contracted certain management duties to government agencies and third
parties.
The French government created the SPPE as a simplified joint stock corporation (Société
par actions simplifiée) and limited liability company with the French government as its only
shareholder (Conac 2010; SPPE 2010). It had no employees and awarded no compensation
to its directors or executive management (SPPE 2010). In order to manage its assets, the
SPPE delegated roles to government and external agencies. For example, Ernst & Young
performed an external audit of the SPPE financial statements in accordance with applicable
French law for the year ended December 31, 2010 (SPPE 2011). The Agence France Trésor
(AFT), the government agency responsible for managing public debts, managed debt
issuances by the SPPE, including the handling of margin calls and hedging foreign exchange
exposures. As previously mentioned, the APE absorbed the SPPE financial statements onto
its balance sheet (SPPE 2010). The Commission Bancaire, the primary regulator for both
banks and investment firms, performed functions such as assessing potential participants
and approving bank applications for exiting the program (EC 2008).
6. Size: The French government initially allocated €40 billion for the SPPE, but the
EC revised this budget to €21 billion and planned to inject capital in two phases.
The EC approved the initial injections along with the option for a second installment of an
identical amount under matching conditions should market conditions continue to
deteriorate (EC 2008). Approximately a month and a half after the EC approved the initial
plan on December 8, 2008, the French government notified the EC of a second installment
on January 21, 2009. The EC approved the second installment on January 28, 2009, noting
that the market conditions that led to the first installment still prevailed (EC 2009a). The
CB calculated both injection amounts to increase the Tier 1 ratios of participating banks by
0.5%. In total, the two installments brought the initial budget to €21 billion (EC 2008).
7. Size: The French government requested and received an additional €500 million
into the merged Caisses d’Epargne and Banques Populaires entity.
In addition to adding preference shares to the second injection, the French government
increased the budget by €500 million to bolster the merged Caisses d’Epargne and Banques
Populaires’ Tier 1 ratio by 50 basis points (EC 2009b). Although Caisses d’Epargne and
Banques Populaires individually received €1.1 billion and €0.95 billion, respectively, the
French authorities felt further capital was required as the merged entities would
consolidate all of their risk-weighted assets but only a portion of their share capital (BdF
2010b). The EC approved the increase in budget, and the merged BPCE entity received the
additional €3 billion following its merger on July 31, 2009 (EC 2009b).
8. Source of Injections: The SPPE funded itself by issuing short-term, stateguaranteed bonds.
The SPPE funded itself by issuing debt guaranteed by the state. These bonds were
irrevocable, unconditional, first demand (an added form of protection in which the creditor
is guaranteed repayment regardless of other transactions), ensured through the Caisse de
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la Dette Publique (French Public Debt Fund), a fund that backs the creditworthiness of the
French government in financial markets, and available in any currency of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (EC 2008; SPPE 2009). The minister of the
economy dictated the specific characteristics for each funding operation, such as duration
and guarantee size (EC 2008). SPPE bonds primarily consisted of short-term notes because
yields on short-term debt were significantly lower, and therefore cheaper, than those on
longer-term debt. Also, banks had a strong motivation to redeem capital injections quickly
(Conac 2010).
9. Eligible Institutions: The application to receive SPPE injections was open to
credit institutions satisfying set criteria.
The French authorities outlined a set of criteria for credit institutions, including foreign
subsidiaries operating in France, in order to qualify for capital injections under the SPPE
(EC 2008). The criteria were based off of the Article 87(3)(b) provision (see “Key Design
Decision No. 3”) that the program was approved under. The credit institutions satisfying
the following criteria were eligible to apply for recapitalization by the SPPE:
(1) Authorized in France and supervised under the French Monetary and Financial
Code;
(2) In compliance with the own funds [regulatory capital] requirement in the French
Monetary and Financial Code;
(3) In a financial position to be able to guarantee its long-term viability and to present
a positive economic situation in accordance with the criteria normally used in the
banking sector;
(4) Previously concluded an agreement with the state fixing the consideration
provided for by law; and
(5) In such a position that a severe and sudden reduction in its activity would have a
serious impact on the French economy (State Aid N/613 2008).
The CB examined and approved individual bank applications based on the above
qualifications. Ultimately, six French banking groups applied to receive funds, and all were
approved (EC 2008).
10. Eligible Institutions: The capital injection program relied on voluntary
participation by eligible credit institutions.
The SPPE focused on providing funds to a large number of financially sound banks rather
than rescuing near-bankrupt institutions (Jabko and Massoc 2012). The intervention was a
precautionary measure to shore up capital ratios and spur lending to the French economy
(Conac 2010). Therefore, there were no legal requirements or sanctions enacted to compel
banks to receive funds (EC 2008; Jabko and Massoc 2012). The CB was responsible for
reviewing and approving these applications. The participants, which represented more
than 80% of France’s net banking income, included Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Groupe
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Crédit Agricole, Groupe Crédit Mutuel, Groupe Caisses d’Epargne, and Groupe Banques
Populaires. HSBC France was eligible to receive funds through the scheme but declined to
apply (EC 2008).
Some of the six participating institutions, including Société Générale, publicly expressed
hesitation regarding the capital injections. Conac cited this reluctance as evidence that the
program was not necessarily voluntary—in other words, the government was pressuring
banks to accept the funds. He stated, “By forcing all major French banks to participate into
the scheme, the Government prevented the market from identifying a weaker one and
creating a panic” (Conac 2010). This issue also arose during Christine Lagarde’s testimony
on October 22, 2008, when Dominique Baert, a member of the French National Assembly
Finance Committee, expressed concern about providing funds to nonstruggling institutions.
He questioned whether providing capital to all institutions hid those that really needed it
from the markets (Lagarde 2008).
11. Capital Characteristics: The first capital injection consisted of deeply
subordinated, hybrid debt securities.
On December 11, 2008, the SPPE injected €10.5 billion into six French banks through a
subordinated-debt security called Titres super subordonnés à durée indéterminée (Conac
2010; EC 2008). TSS were hybrid debt securities with a maturity of 99 years (or perpetual)
and were commonly issued by French banks prior to the crisis (EC 2008). Lagarde
characterized them as halfway between debt and capital in her testimony (Lagarde 2008).
For these securities to qualify as Tier 1 capital, they had to fulfill Basel requirements of
permanent type, subordination ranking placing the bearers just before shareholders
(including preference shares), and ability to absorb losses. The CB categorized TSS as
noncore Tier 1 and set a ceiling of 35% of total Tier 1 capital (EC 2008).
Additional requirements included:
(1) Maturity of 99 years or perpetual;
(2) Two-phase remuneration;
(3) Subordination level over shareholders and to holders of the issuer’s equity
securities;
(4) Subordination level below holders of bond instruments;
(5) Obligatory interest payments following remuneration of capital shareholders;
(6) Loss absorbing; and
(7) Reimbursement at any time, pending approval by the CB (EC 2008).
There were a number of reasons behind the French government’s decision to limit
injections to TSS instead of more subordinated securities such as ordinary or preference
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shares. Since participating banks were solvent and healthy, injections of better-quality
capital were not necessary; it also could have sent a negative signal to the markets that the
banks receiving capital were in a worse situation than initially disclosed. In addition,
ordinary and preference shares would have been more expensive and required an
extraordinary shareholders meeting, and French banks did not commonly use preference
shares (Conac 2010).
Lagarde explained that the decision to use TSS was because the injection of higher-quality
capital was not justified, as the recipients were strong, well-managed, well-supervised
banks that had the added support of robust retail businesses. Therefore, the increased
costs and negative signaling effects associated with higher-quality capital would be
counterproductive. She also highlighted that TSS closely aligned with the goals of the
program as it facilitated financing of the economy without taking equity stakes and
attempting to reorient activity (Lagarde 2008).
12. Dividends/Pricing: Participant banks remunerated the TSS in two phases and
redeemed them at a penalty rate that increased yearly.
The Banque de France used the below formulas to calculate interest payments; they paid
the fixed rate for the first five years followed by the variable rate (State Aid N/613 2008).
(1) Fixed Rate: Bond du Trésor à taux fixe et à intérêt annuel (BTAN)5 five years +
300 bps + 5 x credit default swap (CDS);6 or
(2) Variable Rate: EURIBOR + 250 bps + 5 x CDS (EC 2008).
Given the BTAN was approximately 3% prior to the December 11, 2008, issuance, the rate
dictated by the above fixed-rate formula was around 8%, varying slightly depending on the
participating bank (EC 2008). According to Lagarde, 8% was the approximate rate that
French banks paid during 2008 to raise this type of debt (Lagarde 2008).
This remuneration structure provided stability, included a market rate, accounted for each
institution’s individual credit profile, and represented a penalty remuneration rate in
comparison to an improved market. In order to classify the issued funds as Tier 1 capital,
there could not be a leap in rates for these securities compared to market conditions.
Therefore, the French government implemented an initial fixed-rate period to provide the
required stability. As EURIBOR is a widely accepted market benchmark, its inclusion
expanded the liquidity for these securities on the secondary market. The rate reflected each
participant’s risk profile by referencing the CDS spreads for the beneficiary institution
5

Bond du Trésor à taux fixe et à intérêt annuel (BTAN) = average rate on the five-year government bonds
during the 20 days preceding the issue.
6

Credit default swap (CDS) = average value of the five-year CDS spreads for the specific beneficiary
institution over the period from January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008 (if unavailable, the average five-year CDS
in the beneficiary institution’s credit rating category was used).
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while multiplying that spread by five to account for the subordination level of the security.
These high rates also motivated beneficiaries to withdraw from the scheme quickly as the
rates would likely prove relatively higher than those available in improved market
conditions (EC 2008).
An additional feature of the injections was a nominal annual increase of the amount to be
redeemed. Similar to the remuneration rate, this yearly increase acted as an incentive for
banks to exit the scheme quickly once market conditions improved (EC 2008). Under this
arrangement, the nominal amount increased to 1% if redeemed between the first and
second year and to 3% between the second and third years. It then increased by an
additional 2% annually until the seventh year, reaching a maximum of 11% (Conac 2010;
EC 2008).
13. Capital Characteristics: For the second injection, the CB gave banks the option of
issuing TSS or preference shares.
On January 21, 2009, the French authorities submitted an amended capital injection
scheme to the EC. Under this updated proposal, the CB allowed banks to choose between
two different securities for the second round of capital injections: the TSS securities
approved on December 8, 2008, or newly introduced preference shares. These preference
shares were on equal footing with ordinary shares in terms of liquidation as well as on a
going concern basis and were not subject to Tier 1 capital limits due to their core Tier 1
capital classification (although they were limited to 50% of share capital for unlisted
companies and 25% for listed companies). However, the preference shares were
nonconvertible, nonvoting, and had priority for dividend payments over ordinary
shareholders. The issuing bank could buy back these shares, subject to the consent of the
CB, at the higher of either 110% of the current price of the shares or the 30-day average
price of the shares prior to the buyback date (EC 2009a).
The CB introduced preference shares during the second round of capital injections due to
logistical reasons that centered on Tier 1 capital limitations. Partly due to the first round of
injections, most banks had reached the 35% ceiling of Tier 1 capital imposed on noncore
Tier 1 securities, therefore limiting the beneficiaries’ ability to issue more TSS. The
preference shares solved this issue by increasing Tier 1 capital overall and subsequently
allowing more TSS to be included in the Tier 1 ratio (Conac 2010). They also allowed banks
to increase their core Tier 1 capital ratios, which was positive for the banking system over
the long term (EC 2009a).
In order to allow participants to take full advantage of the amendment, French authorities
gave banks that received the first injection the option of repaying TSS with the proceeds
from issuing preference shares (EC 2009a). BNP Paribas pursued this strategy by issuing
€5.1 billion of preference shares and using approximately half of those funds to repurchase
TSS from the first injection (BdF 2010b).

78

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

14. Dividends/Pricing: The French government amended the terms of the
preference shares to further encourage quick redemption.
The French government notified the EC of an amendment to the updated January 28, 2009,
scheme on March 16, 2009, prior to any issuance of preference shares under the plan. It
created a more powerful incentive for banks to exit the program quickly. The changes were
twofold, increasing remuneration and creating a jump in redemption costs on June 30,
2013. The remuneration on preference shares was the higher of two rate formulas (see
“Key Design Decision No. 13”). The amendment modified the first rate, adding the dictated
0.25% premium from 2009 instead of 2010 (EC 2009b).
Previously, banks were able to repurchase their preference shares at the higher of two
rates regardless of redemption date (see “Key Design Decision No. 12”) (EC 2009a). The
revised plan created a jump in redemption costs on June 30, 2013, through the below
structure.
Prior to June 30, 2013 (higher of the below two values):
(1) The current value increased by the accrued coupon, or
(2) The average stock market price over the 30 days preceding the repurchase.
Following June 30, 2013 (higher of the below two values):
(1) 110% of the current value increased by the accrued coupon, or
(2) The average stock market price over the 30 days preceding the repurchase (EC
2009b).
15. Dividends/Pricing: The remuneration on preference shares was set higher than
that for TSS.
The remuneration for preference shares issued during the second capital injection was set
at the higher of:
(1) Entry (fixed) rate for TSS increasing 25 bps annually, applied to the actual number
of preference shares; or
(2) The rate equal to 105% of the dividend per ordinary share for the 2009 financial
year, divided by the unit issue price for preference shares (increasing to 110% for
the 2010 financial year, 115% for 2011–2017, and 125% for 2018) (EC 2009a).
Based on market conditions at the time, the above formulas resulted in an entry rate of 8%.
Although the entry rate was equal to TSS, these rates were deliberately costlier over time
to reflect a greater degree of subordination and. In comparison to the TSS’s average annual
return for the first five years, the preference shares remuneration was higher by at least
0.85% (EC 2009a).
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16. Other Conditions: Participating banks adopted a number of behavioral
commitments in exchange for funds, administered by a credit mediator and a
unit of the CB that monitored lending at the local level.
Beneficiaries of the SPPE capital injections were expected to commit to the below
behavioral requirements:
(1) Limitations on compensation to senior executives and market operators (traders);
(2) Seeking to maintain an annual growth rate of 3%–4% of overall lending to the
French economy;
(3) Performing case-by-case solutions for clients that were struggling to repay certain
loans;
(4) Striving to finance local authorities’ investment requirements;
(5) Not engaging in unfair practices (such as using the capital injection as an
advertisement);
(6) No repurchasing of shares for the duration of the SPPE’s holding of TSS; and
(7) Monthly presentation of a report on lending volume and trends (EC 2008).
It is important to note that the CB did not back the credit monitoring and mediation by
sanctions. The CB feared that the threat of punishment could harm the market; instead, it
relied on the reputational damage of noncompliance (EC 2008). The CB also did not put
limitations on the payment of dividends, only ensuring that the participants prioritized
dividend payments to preference shares held by the SPPE over ordinary shareholders (EC
2009a).
The participating banks agreed to restrictions on executive compensation prior to the first
capital injection. These limits included banning severance payments to executives of failed
institutions or individuals who quit and providing a compensation policy to regulators for
“market operators,” such as traders (EC 2008). According to the Banque de France, in
response to this assistance, “In early 2009, the top managers of the country’s leading banks
unanimously waived their bonuses for 2008” (BdF 2009).
The credit-growth requirement was particularly important, as increased lending to the
overall economy was a stated goal of the program, along with enhancing Tier 1 capital (BdF
2010a). To facilitate credit growth and ensure compliance, the CB instituted an oversight
framework that aligned with the program, including a national credit mediator that
arbitrated issues for companies suffering credit issues (EC 2008). The primary goal of this
mediator was to “to ensure that no business had to face its financial problems alone, to
ensure that banks lived up to their commitments and to provide information and advice to
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the government.” The network of département7-level BdF heads acted as regional
mediators, performing an initial proceeding that prioritized companies struggling in the
previous six months, indicating they were victims of the overall economic downturn (BdF
2010a). If the involved parties did not reach a solution, either the regional mediator or
company could appeal the case to the national mediator (EC 2008). The national credit
mediator received 2,500 applications in the first two months of its existence and 20,000 by
the end of 2009 with an acceptance rate of 84%. From the introduction of the program to
the end of 2009, the credit mediation mechanism resulted in more than €2 billion in loans
to more than 9,000 business, safeguarding an estimated 160,000 jobs (BdF 2010a).
Additionally, the French government took steps to supervise banks at the local level,
ensuring that loan increases aligned with predetermined targets. Two units performed this
monitoring, an operational-monitoring unit and département committee for financing the
economy (commissions départementales de financement de l’économie or CDFE). The
département préfet8 was responsible for constructing the operational-monitoring unit, and
the regional mediator served on it. The CDFE contained representatives from banking
networks in the individual département, the OSEO,9 BdF, and other local economic agencies.
This committee had three objectives: inform local economic agencies of national-level
initiatives, evaluate the département-level situation to restore the business lending market,
and monitor bank-lending commitments at the local level (EC 2008).
17. Exit Strategy: The application period to receive funds from the SPPE was from
December 8, 2008, to August 30, 2009.
Originally, the application period to receive funds was supposed to last for six months, from
December 8, 2008, to June 8, 2009; however, the CB extended the deadline to August 30,
2009. The extension was due to the requirement that a bank hold an extraordinary general
meeting of its shareholders to authorize the issuance of preference shares. The French
authorities also cited uncertain market conditions as support for the extended application
period (EC 2009a).
Banks were able to redeem the TSS or preference shares issued under the scheme at any
time, subject to the approval of the CB (EC 2008; EC 2009a).
18. Amendments to Relevant Regulation: The CB increased the noncore Tier 1
capital ceiling to allow banks to participate.
On November 3, 2008, the CB decided to increase the ceiling of noncore Tier 1 capital to
35% after some banks already reached the previous limit of 25% (Conac 2010; EC 2008).

The département is a regional level of government in France; there are 96 in the metropolitan area and five
overseas.
8 Préfets are officials who represent the state in each département.
9 The OSEO, now known as Banque Publique d’Investissement is a French agency that aims to promote small
and medium-sized enterprises.
7
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This change allowed banks to take full advantage of the capital injections provided by the
SPPE (Conac 2010).

III. Evaluation
The Banque de France found that the interventions it orchestrated were successful. It
argued that, “the streamlined structure” constructed in order to increase own funds
allowed the government to customize its actions to support banks. The BdF also viewed the
SPPE and SFEF as instrumental in protecting French banks from liquidity and solvency
risks during the turbulence that occurred between September 2008 and March 2009 (BdF
2010a).
A number of academic analyses evaluated the SPPE and SFEF intervention. An
International Monetary Fund working paper by Xiao (2009) examined the effect of the
French support plans on the financial sector by analyzing market information and balance
sheets prior to and immediately following the announcement of both the SPPE (only the
first injection) and SFEF schemes. The study found that following the French support plan
announcement, banks’ credit risk, as measured by credit default swap spreads, decreased
substantially. There was a varied impact on equity prices: the gross effect on equity prices
was positive, but after controlling for benchmarks and beta (overall market movements),
the adjusted impact was negative.
Conac (2010) concluded that the French rescue was an overall success, arguing that even
though the French financial sector was relatively less impacted by the crisis, the rescue
plan was speedily implemented and ultimately profitable. He also cited the French
authority’s ability to achieve management changes and limitations on compensation, as
well as active communications that “promote[d] its agenda on banking regulation and
bankers’ compensation.” Conversely, Conac found that the major failure of the program
was not leveraging the opportunity to pass a law, similar to the laws passed in Germany,
that allowed for nationalizing or assuming control over an ailing financial institution.
Jabko and Massoc (2012) found that the rescue plan had two unique elements. First, France
constructed new entities to take on specific roles during the crisis—the entities did not
explicitly bail out failing firms; instead, they provided general support to the entire
industry. Compared to other countries that engaged in massive rescue plans for nearbankrupt institutions, the SPPE and SFEF provided funds among all major French banks.
Similarly, the use of preference shares and TSS resulted in an indirect intervention instead
of substantial equity stakes in individual banks.
Jabko and Massoc (2012) argued that the French authorities requested comparatively little
from the beneficiaries in exchange for assistance. They noted that the aid was not
compelled; no sanctions were levied; the lack of voting rights for the shares meant the
government had no oversight of management; executive compensation limits were not
legally binding; and no limitations were placed on dividend payments. Due to this relatively
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moderate approach, Jabko and Massoc concluded that the plan was “exceptionally
generous, beyond the requirements of the situation.”
The Cour des Comptes (Court of Audit), the supreme body for auditing the use of public
funds in France, issued a 2013 Annual Public Report that reviewed government
interventions during the financial crisis, including the SPPE, in order to provide
recommendations going forward (Cour des Comptes 2013). These recommendations
included:
(1) Provide an annual statement disclosing the impact of bank support plans, including
the SPPE and SFEF, on the French state;
(2) Incorporate a breakdown of credit provided to local and regional authorities apart
from ‘local public administrations’ into existing credit reports;
(3) Integrate a permanent compensation monitoring unit into the Prudential
Supervisory Authority, a department of Banque de France, and implement an a
priori approach to supervising compensation structures for executives and board
members; and
(4) Implement a provision requiring credit establishments to subject the compensation
budgets for executives and board members to an advisory shareholders’ vote at a
general meeting (Cour des Comptes 2013).
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(EC 2009b) State Aid N/164/2009 – France: Amendment to the Capital-Injection Scheme
for Banks European Commission document describing the body’s approval of an amendment
to the capital injection scheme regarding new repurchase terms.
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(SPPE n.d.) Assets Held by SPPE, as of 22 October 2009 and 6 June 2011
Diagram published by SPPE detailing the change in asset holdings by type of capital.
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